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Abstract
This paper analyses the link between economic fundamentals and exchange rates
by investigating the importance of real-time data. We find that such economic
news in the United States, Germany and the euro area have indeed been a driving
force behind daily US dollar – euro/DEM exchange rate developments in the
period 1993-2003. The larger importance of US macroeconomic news is at least
partly explained by their earlier release time compared to corresponding German
and euro area news. The exchange rate is also shown to respond more strongly to
news in periods of large market uncertainty and when negative or large shocks
occur. Overall, the model based on real-time data is capable of explaining about
75% of the monthly directional changes of the US dollar-euro exchange rate,
although it does not explain well the magnitude of the exchange rate changes.
JEL classification: F31, F42, E52.
Keywords: exchange rates; fundamentals; announcements; news; real-time
data; United States; euro area; interdependence; US dollar euro; EMU.5
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20 years after the influential paper by Meese and Rogoff (1983), only modest 
progress has been made in explaining and predicting exchange rate movements with 
macroeconomic fundamentals. In particular, econometric attempts to explain short- 
and medium-term movements in exchange rates have had limited success so far. 
 
This paper takes a different and relatively novel approach to analysing the link 
between fundamentals and exchange rate movements. We argue that a potentially 
important shortcoming of standard, fundamentals-based models of the exchange rate 
is that they use measures of fundamentals that do not accurately reflect the true 
information market participants have when making trading decisions. In this paper, 
we test for the role and importance of real-time data, i.e. data about daily 
announcements of relevant macroeconomic and monetary policy variables as they 
become available to financial markets. 
 
The paper attempts to contribute to the literature in two central ways. First, the paper 
focuses on the presence of asymmetries in the reaction of exchange rates, and in 
particular on the question whether existing market conditions are an important 
determinant for explaining why the conditional means of exchange rates react 
differently to macroeconomics news over time. And second, the paper provides an 
evaluation of the overall importance of macro news on exchange rates. This second 
issue is of large relevance because from a policy perspective, news about economic 
fundamentals are important for overall exchange rate movements only if these effects 
are sufficiently long-lived in that they drive exchange rate developments on a daily or 
monthly frequency. 
 
Looking at a broad set of the most important macroeconomic and monetary policy 
news in the United States and the euro area/Germany for the period 1993-2003, we 
find that, first, news about fundamentals can explain relatively well the direction in 
recent years, but only to a much smaller extent the magnitude of daily and monthly 
exchange rate developments. We show that the exchange rate model using real-time 
data outperforms strongly the same exchange rate model using vintage data. The 
model using real-time data correctly explains 73% of the directional changes of 6
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monthly exchange rates, whereas the model using vintage data only correctly 
accounts for 60% of the directional changes. 
 
Second, we find that news about the US economy have a larger impact on exchange 
rate movements than news emanating from the euro area. We show that this may 
reflect at least in part the fact that US announcements are usually released earlier than 
comparable euro area or German announcements. Third, the effects of news on 
exchange rates are found to be asymmetric in that they depend on market conditions. 
More specifically, news effects on exchange rates are larger in times when there is a 
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1.  Introduction
20 years after the influential paper by Meese and Rogoff (1983), only modest progress has
been made in explaining and predicting exchange rate movements with macroeconomic
fundamentals. While fundamentals-based models have been developed over the years that
perform reasonably well in explaining exchange rate developments in the long-run,
econometric attempts to explain short- and medium-term movements in exchange rates
have had limited success so far.
1 There is a broad consensus that some of the reasons for
the poor performance of empirical models to account for exchange rate developments on a
short- and medium-term horizon have not only to do with econometric problems, such as
small sample biases, but also with irrationality of market participants, bubbles, herd
behaviour etc., i.e. factors which are hard to capture in econometric models.
Over the past decade, two approaches have emerged in the literature that have made
some progress in understanding exchange rate dynamics at short- to medium-term
horizons. One of these approaches suggests that the chartist behaviour of market
participants, i.e. the pursuit of technical trading rules that are unrelated to fundamentals,
may account for some of the large movements and overshooting of currencies (Allen and
Taylor 1990, Cheung and Chinn 1999, De Grauwe and Dewachter 1993). A more recent
approach based on the seminal work by Evans and Lyons (2002) has shown that exchange
rates at short horizons are to a significant extent driven by order flow, i.e. excess buyer-
initiated or seller-initiated trading which reflects a market's information processing
mechanism and which may be unrelated to existing macroeconomic fundamentals.
However, Evans and Lyons (2003) and Love and Payne (2002) find that much of this order
flow is in fact closely linked to news about fundamentals.
This paper takes a third approach to analysing the link between fundamentals and
exchange rate movements. We argue that a potentially important shortcoming of standard,
fundamentals-based models of the exchange rate is that they use measures of fundamentals
that do not accurately reflect the true information market participants have when making
trading decisions. In this paper, we use real-time data – similar to Andersen, Bollerslev,
Diebold and Vega 2003, Faust, Rogers, Wang and Wright 2003 or Galati and Ho 2003 –
for the announcements of monetary policy decisions and important macroeconomic
variables in the United States, Germany and the euro area, as measures of fundamentals.
More precisely, exploiting survey data on market participants’ expectations of such8
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 365
May 2004
announcements, we are able to extract the surprise or “news” component of each variable.
We then test whether these market news about fundamentals are capable of explaining the
behaviour of daily exchange rate movements of the US dollar vis-à-vis the euro and
German mark for the period 1993-2003. This approach has the key advantage of allowing
us to test much more directly whether fundamentals – as they become available to market
participants – can account for the price discovery process in foreign exchange markets.
The paper attempts to make a contribution to the literature in two central regards.
First, it focuses on the presence of asymmetries in the reaction of exchange rates, and in
particular on the question whether the reaction of the conditional means of exchange rates
to macroeconomics news depends on existing market conditions. Such a non-linear
behaviour is predicted, e.g. by the theoretical work on herd behaviour and information
cascades (Banerjee 1992, Bikchandani, Hirschleifer and Welch 1992), or if agents use
different information sets to forecast the future exchange rate (De Grauwe and
Vansteenkiste 2002). Second, the paper provides an evaluation of the overall importance of
macro news on exchange rates by analysing exchange rate responses at a daily rather than
an intra-daily frequency, since intra-daily analyses show that the effects of news on
exchange rates are generally very short-lived and often disappear within minutes (e.g.
Dominguez 1999, Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega 2003). We argue, however, that
news about macroeconomic fundamentals are important for overall exchange rate
movements only if these effects are longer-lived.
We find three key results. First, we show that news about fundamentals can explain
relatively well the direction, but only to a much smaller extent the magnitude of exchange
rate developments taking a medium-term, i.e. monthly horizon. We show that the exchange
rate model using real-time data outperforms the same exchange rate model using vintage
data: the former correctly explains 73% of the directional changes of the exchange rate,
whereas the latter only accounts for 60% of the directional changes. This suggests that we
can improve our understanding of movements in exchange rates at the short- to medium-
term horizon by focusing on real-time data.
Second, we find that news about the US economy have a larger impact on exchange
rates than news emanating from the euro area. We show that this may reflect not only the
relatively greater importance of the US economy, but is at least partly explained by the fact
                                                                                                                                                                                
1 See e.g. Mark (1995) and Cheung, Chinn and Garcia Pascual (2002) for a discussion and evaluation of
exchange rate models of the 1980s and 1990s.9
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that US announcements are usually released earlier than comparable euro area or German
announcements, which gives US announcements a relatively higher news content.
A third important finding is that the effects of news on exchange rates are
asymmetric in that they crucially depend on market conditions. More precisely, news
releases have a particularly large effect on exchange rates when there is a high degree of
market uncertainty, in the sense that previous news did not provide a clear signal about the
direction of the economy. In addition, exchange rates tend to react more strongly to news
in periods when previous exchange rate volatility has been high.
The paper is structured in the following way. We proceed in section 2 by outlining
the rationale for using real-time data. Section 2 also discusses the construction of our data
set, in particular how we extract market “news” about economic fundamentals. Section 3
then briefly outlines our econometric approach. The empirical results are presented in
sections 4 and 5. Section 4 provides the results for the linear models, whereas Section 5
tests for the presence of asymmetries. An overall evaluation of the performance and
goodness-of-fit of our real-time model follows in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2.  Exchange rates, fundamentals and news: the data
2.1  Fundamentals and news: the case for using real-time data
The issue of how to accurately measure economic fundamentals is a difficult one. Most
empirical work, not only on the determination of exchange rates but more generally on
most asset prices, employs the most recent vintage data, i.e. the final, revised figures that
are generally released several months or quarters after the period to which the data refers.
There are a number of problems with using such data. In particular, economic variables are
mostly released only with a considerable time lag. Moreover, the first release of data on
fundamentals is mostly revised at least once and in some cases several times. It often takes
several quarters for the final data of an economic variable to be released. Therefore, using
such final, revised data essentially tries to explain changes in asset prices with explanatory
variables that are not known to market participants until several months later.
The use of real-time data instead, i.e. data that is actually available to economic
agents at any one point in time, can fundamentally alter the results and interpretations of
economic models. Orphanides (2001), for instance, finds that interpretations of monetary
policy in the United States change fundamentally when using real-time data instead of10
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vintage data when estimating Taylor rules. Koenig et al. (2000) show that the forecasts
performance for US GDP changes substantially when using real-time data.
To illustrate the bias that may arise from the use of vintage data, Table 1 compares
the quarterly advance US GDP releases, which usually occur the month after each quarter,
with the preliminary and the final, revised GDP figures, which are mostly released two and
three months, respectively, after each quarter. The table reveals that there are relatively
large revisions in this data between the first (advance) and final release, which have been,
on average, at the magnitude of 0.6 percentage points in the year-on-year quarterly GDP
growth rate in 1993-2003. The table shows that most of the revision is made for the second
release, the release of the “preliminary” GDP figures. The high correlations between the
revisions and their surprise components in the data, shown in the last two columns, indicate
that the revisions are indeed mostly unpredictable by the markets.
Although some previous work has analysed the effect of real-time data on foreign
exchange markets, it has mostly focused on explaining changes in the conditional
variances (e.g. Andersen and Bollerslev 1998, Ederington and Lee 1993). Only relatively
few studies have so far attempted to test for the effect of real-time macroeconomic news on
the conditional mean process of foreign exchange markets, as we do in this paper.
Almeida, Goodhart and Payne (1998) look at the DM exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar
and find significant intra-day effects of macroeconomic announcements. This is in line
with some of those authors' earlier work (Goodhart, Hall, Henry, and Pesaran 1993), who
find US and UK macroeconomic news to change the pound-US dollar exchange rate.
Two recent studies in this spirit are Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003)
and Faust, Rogers, Wang and Wright (2003), who look at various currencies vis-à-vis the
US dollar for the period 1992 till 1998 and 1987 till 2002, respectively. Using five-minute
and 20-minute intervals, they find that various US macro news significantly affect
exchange rates, with announcements relating to real activity and forward-looking news
exerting the largest, and news about price developments relatively limited effects. An
interesting result of the work by Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) is that
they find some indication for the presence of asymmetries in exchange rate responses to
fundamentals, in that exchange rates tend to react more strongly to large news surprises
and to negative news. Faust, Rogers, Wang and Wright (2003) provide evidence that for
several real announcements, stronger than expected releases appreciate the dollar, but the
announcement must imply a considerable future expected dollar depreciation. Finally,11
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Galati and Ho (2003) analyse the exchange rate of the US dollar against the euro for the
period 1999-2000, and find that for parts of their sample, the market responded dominantly
to bad news from the euro area, while ignoring good news.
2.2  Exchange rates and frequency issues
Most of the previous work using real-time data focuses on intra-day data, usually 5-minute
intervals, for analysing the effect of macroeconomic news on exchange rate levels. The
paper by Galati and Ho (2003) provides an analysis at a daily frequency; however, their
sample is restricted to 1999 and 2000. There are two key reasons why we chose not to use
high-frequency data, and use daily data instead. First, there is some evidence that some
German releases are “leaked” to the markets prior to their official release time (Andersen,
Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega 2003). A second reason is that asset prices may initially
“overshoot” in their reaction to news (Faust, Rogers, Wang and Wright 2003). This may
imply that the true permanent effect of news on exchange rates may be smaller than the
initial, immediate reaction.
By contrast, the main drawback of choosing a daily frequency is that a large number
of news, far larger than could possibly be measured and observed, “hits” the markets
throughout a typical trading day. Hence our estimate of the news effect of any given
macroeconomic variable includes noise from other news during the day. However, the
important point to emphasise is that this does not lead to a bias in the estimates of news
effects as long as the other news during the days of a particular announcement are not
systematic or reflect other recurring news. It only means that the point estimates are not
efficient, resulting in larger standard errors of the coefficients of the news effects.
We use the daily US dollar – euro/DEM rate at 18.00 Eastern Standard Time (EST),
which implies that both European and US news are reflected in the exchange rate on the
same day.
2.3  Extracting market news about economic fundamentals
The approach we follow in this paper is to analyse the relevance of real-time data of
fundamentals for exchange rate movements at a daily frequency. The real-time data
consists of the data releases for important macroeconomic variables as well as of monetary
policy decisions, reflecting in real time the information that becomes available to the
markets every day.12
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However, it should be emphasised that on the day of the announcement, we can
expect the markets to react only to the unexpected component, or “news” or “surprise”, of
an announcement. The remaining component of the announcement has been incorporated
into the market previously, but since we cannot determine the exact timing of when this
occurred, we cannot measure its impact on the markets to the same degree of accuracy.
Our measure of news is therefore the surprise component (Sk,t) of the announcement
k, which is defined as the difference between the actual announcement (Ak,t) and the
market’s prior expectation (Ek,t), normalised by dividing by the sample standard deviation
Ωk of each announcement in order to allow a comparison of the relative size of the
coefficients in the econometric model:
k









The data source for the macroeconomic variables is MMS International. The expectations
data (Et) is the median of a survey of around 40 market participants on the Friday prior to
each announcement. Our data set includes about 120 news for each variable, given the time
period 1 January 1993 – 14 February 2003 and the fact that announcements for most
variables occur on a monthly frequency.
Tables 2 and 3 show some summary and descriptive statistics of the macroeconomic
variables for the United States, Germany and the euro area included in the model. Previous
work using MMS expectations data shows that statistical tests confirm unbiasedness and
efficiency of the survey data (Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2004). Finally, Figure 1 shows the
non-standardised surprises for all the macroeconomic and monetary policy variables.
We also look at news about monetary policy decisions as a potential factor driving
movements in the US dollar – euro/DEM exchange rate. Similar to the approach for the
macroeconomic variables, we extract the market surprise about monetary policy decisions
using survey data from Reuters. We define the monetary policy surprise as the difference
between the actual announcement by the Fed, ECB or Bundesbank and the mean of the
expectations of the around 25-30 market participants in the Reuters survey. As shown in
our previous work on money markets (Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2004), this measure of
monetary policy surprises proves not only unbiased and efficient statistically but performs13
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relatively well empirically compared to other measures of such surprises.
2 Table 4 presents
some summary statistics for the monetary policy announcements and surprises for the three
central banks and confirms that market participants were mostly able to anticipate
monetary policy decisions well.
3.  Exchange rate responses to news: the econometric model
We choose an iterative, weighted least squares (WLS) procedure, adopting a similar
approach to Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher
(2004), in order to test for the news effects of daily announcement surprises and in order to
account for the data characteristics described in the previous section. The benchmark
model we estimate is

























1 1 ln ln (1)
where  et is the daily, nominal US dollar – euro/DEM exchange rate,
3  st are the news
surprises in each market, and Mon and Fri are included to account for potential day-of-the-
week effects. Lags of the exchange rate change are also included to correct for possible
autocorrelation, although in most cases a single lag was sufficient, which moreover was
not always significant in the estimation.
Since the error term εt is non-normal and heteroskedastic, we correct for this by using
an iterative WLS approach. The first step implies estimating equation (1) via OLS. The
second step then estimates an equation for the residuals in the following way:



























2 ˆ ln ˆ ln (2)
                                                          
2 For alternative measures for the United States based on Fed funds futures, see Kuttner (2001) and
Söderström (2001). Such market-based measures could not be tested in the context of our analysis due to the
non-availability of similar data for Germany.
3 The exchange rate prior to 1999 is the US dollar – DEM rate with the DEM divided by its euro convergence
rate in order to make the pre- and post-1999 periods comparable.14
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with nt defined as the absolute values of the surprises st. In the third step, the estimated
volatility      t t   ˆ ˆ ln exp
2   is then employed as instrument in the WLS estimation of
equation (1). These three steps are iterated till convergence is achieved.
4
Finally, we conducted different tests to control for possible multicollinearity
problems resulting from the fact that some of the announcements occur on the same day.
One way of doing this is to exclude from the model some of the news that frequently occur
on the same day. However, the results did not change in any significant way. We therefore
opted to keep all 25 monetary policy and macroeconomic news variables in the model.
4.  How important are fundamentals? Empirical results for linear models
Table 5 presents the news effects on the US dollar – euro/DEM exchange rate for 12 US
macroeconomic news, 11 German/euro area news, and the two monetary policy surprises
in both areas for the full sample period of 1 January 1993 – 14 February 2003.
5
4.1  Exchange rate responses to news reflecting the real economy
Most of the variables have the correct sign in that an improvement in real economic
conditions in the United States leads to an appreciation of the US dollar (i.e. a lower US
dollar – euro/DEM exchange rate) whereas good news in the euro area/Germany induce an
appreciation of the euro/DEM vis-à-vis the US dollar, and analogously for negative news
in the two areas. Overall, however, US news prove to be more important in driving
exchange rate developments than euro area/German news.
Most of the variables for the real economy of the United States have indeed a
statistically significant news effect on the exchange rate: an improvement in NAPM, a rise
in non-farm payroll employment, higher GDP growth, higher consumer confidence, lower
                                                          
4 In principle, estimating such models in a GARCH framework would be superior due to the direct estimation
of the conditional second moments in GARCH models. However, a GARCH specification could not be used
in our context due to the large number of parameters in the model resulting from the inclusion of 25 different
announcement news. This large number of parameters frequently led to problems in the convergence of the
maximum likelihood estimation. Moreover, our results are also robust to estimating the model via OLS with
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation consistent standard errors.
5 We have conducted stability tests to exclude the possibility of parameter instability especially around the
start of EMU on January 1
st, 1999. However, we found the model to be stable over time. We have furthermore
tested whether the inclusion of further euro area news might improve the fit of the model. We could not detect
any variable that could add explanatory power, which is likely due to the fact that euro area news are
generally released relatively late, and especially after the corresponding national releases (see Ehrmann and
Fratzscher, 2004).15
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unemployment and a longer workweek all lead to an appreciation of the US dollar.
6 An
improvement in the trade balance, faster growth in industrial production and larger retail
sales also tend to appreciate the US dollar, though these variables are not statistically
significant over the whole 1993-2003 sample period (see Table 5). To provide an order of
magnitude of the news effects of fundamentals, for instance a surprise of one standard
deviation in the advance US GDP measure leads, on average, to a 0.62% appreciation of
the US dollar.
Most euro area/German economic fundamentals also have the correct sign in that an
improvement in real conditions in the euro area/Germany lead to an appreciation of the
euro/DEM. However, the IFO business confidence indicator is the only real economic
variable of the euro area/Germany that is statistically significant over the full sample
period. Nevertheless, the news impact of the IFO indicator is relatively large: an
improvement in the IFO index by one standard deviation causes a 0.85% appreciation of
the euro/DEM vis-à-vis the US dollar. One possible interpretation of this finding is that the
importance of this variable may partly compensate for the lack of significance of other
euro area news variables. In a market environment with a large number of news releases –
as is the case in the euro area where most countries provide additional data announcements
for their own country – market participants may choose to turn to fewer indicators about
the state of the real economy. It seems that the IFO index is such a benchmark indicator for
the euro area. Moreover, it should be noted that the IFO index is one of the earliest data
releases for Germany and the euro area, and thereby may also function as an indicator for
market participants about what to expect about later data releases (see Figure 2).
In short, the results suggest that fundamentals about the real economy have a
significant effect on the US dollar – euro/DEM exchange rate, which is in line with the
results reported by Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) and Faust, Rogers,
Wang and Wright (2003).
4.2  Exchange rate responses to monetary policy shocks
In contrast to the real side of the economy, our theoretical prior for the effect of monetary
policy news on exchange rates is ambiguous. Based on interest rate parity and arbitrage
                                                          
6 As noted by Harvey and Huang (1991), several of the US macro announcements are regularly made on
Fridays. In our case this applies to unemployment, nonfarm payroll and workweek data, which are announced
on Fridays at around 95% of all cases in our sample. We have tested whether the inclusion of the Friday
dummy changes the coefficients, and found only negligible changes to the results. Similarly, including only16
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conditions, an unanticipated monetary tightening by the Federal Reserve should induce an
appreciation of the US dollar, while an unexpected tightening by the ECB/Bundesbank
should lead to an appreciation of the euro/DEM after the news release of such a decision.
7
However, the reaction of exchange rates to monetary policy decisions also depends
on the market’s interpretation of the underlying reasons for the decisions and the expected
effect on the economy. For instance, an unexpected easing of monetary policy may signal
to market participants that the real economy and other asset prices, such as equities, will
receive a significant boost. Hence the easing of monetary policy in such a case may not
lead to a depreciation but even to an appreciation of the exchange rate.
Table 5 shows that a shock to US monetary policy has a significant and large effect
on the US dollar. The point estimate implies that an unexpected tightening of the federal
funds target rate by 50 basis points causes a 0.8% appreciation of the US dollar against the
euro. By contrast, unexpected monetary policy news by the Bundesbank and the ECB did
not have a significant effect on the DEM and euro exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar.
4.3  Exchange rate responses to news about price developments
Concerning news in price developments, there is also no clear-cut theoretical prior as to
how the exchange rate should react. On the one hand, higher than expected inflation may
raise expectations of monetary policy tightening, entailing an immediate appreciation of
the home currency. On the other hand, higher inflation implies, ceteris paribus, an
appreciation of the real exchange rate. If purchasing power parity were to hold, a rise in
inflation would require a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate.
In essence, the likely effect of price developments on the exchange rate crucially
depends on the markets’ beliefs about the central bank’s monetary policy reaction function.
If a central bank is perceived to give great importance to price stability, then an unexpected
rise in inflation is likely to lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate. By contrast, if a
                                                                                                                                                                                
one of the labour market variables in the regression does not affect the results in any significant way. The
different time variations in the variables are obviously sufficient to identify the different coefficients.
7 Note that the medium- to longer-term reaction of the exchange rate to monetary policy shocks can be quite
different from the immediate short-run effects. For uncovered interest rate parity to hold, the exchange rate
needs to depreciate in the medium-run in response to monetary tightening in order to equalise returns after
exchange rate adjustments. Moreover, rational expectations overshooting models in the vein of Dornbusch
(1976) also imply a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate in the longer term – after an initial appreciation
– as prices adjust gradually over time. However, the empirical evidence mostly rejects the hypothesis that
exchange rates depreciate in the medium- and longer-term in response to contractionary monetary policy
shocks. In fact, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Evans (1994) find strong evidence for what they call
“delayed overshooting” in that exchange rates continue to appreciate for a sustained period of time after17
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central bank is believed to give less prominence to price developments or is believed not to
react to a particular news about prices, then the second argument above may prevail and
the exchange rate depreciates.
Table 5 reveals that the US CPI news are borderline significant at the 90% level with
a positive sign. This implies that a rise in US inflation tends to lead, on average, to a
depreciation of the US dollar. This is consistent with the second explanation given above.
4.4 How important is the announcement timing?
Besides the economic content of an announcement, it is likely that its effect on exchange
rates depends on the lag between the announcement and the underlying economic
fundamental. In other words, exchange rates are likely to react more strongly to the release
of a leading indicator than to the release of the final revision of GDP, which refers to
economic activity several months ago. Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003)
provide some suggestive evidence in this direction, without conducting statistical tests. As
can be seen in figure 2, the announcement timing varies strongly for the different variables.
Some announcements (e.g. for US consumer confidence) are made towards the end of the
month for the same month, or quickly afterwards (like the US NAPM indicator). Others are
made more than two months later.
We test the hypothesis that announcement timing matters for the effect on exchange
rates in two ways. First, we analyse whether the size of the estimated response is related to
the announcement timing; and second, we test whether the significance of the estimated
response differs according to the announcement lag. Hence, we regress the absolute values
of the coefficients and t-statistics obtained in table 5 on the maximum announcement
delay, which we measure by the maximum number of days that pass from the end of the
month to which the announcement refers until its release.
8 Table 6 reports the results.
Whereas the magnitude of a coefficient is only weakly related to its announcement
timing, we find stronger effects of timing on the significance of the coefficients, estimated
significantly at the 10% level. Each day of announcement delay makes the t-statistics in
table 5 drop by 0.2. This finding implies that economic content seems to govern the
magnitude of responses, whereas announcement timing strongly determines the
significance of the exchange rate response.
                                                                                                                                                                                
monetary policy tightening. These findings imply the existence of a conditional forward premium bias, i.e. a
monetary policy induced forward premium bias.
8 Using the shortest or medium delay yields similar results.18
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4.5 Exchange rate responses to composite indicators of macroeconomic news
The lack of significant news effects emanating from German and euro area announcements
need not imply that the exchange rate does indeed not react in a systematic fashion. It
could similarly be that even a sample size spanning 10 years is not sufficient to capture the
systematic effects of each individual announcement, especially if the exchange rate
response depends on factors like the market conditions, or other special circumstances
surrounding each announcement, like e.g. their size or sign. In order to increase the number
of observations available for analysis in the remainder of this paper, we create two
composite indicators capturing all macroeconomic variables in the US and all those in the
euro area and perform further testing using this aggregated series.
For this purpose, we generate two indicator functions, one each for the United States
(I
US) and for the euro area (I
EA), which indicate whether on any given day the respective
market yields “good” news (I
US=1, I
EA=1), “bad” news (I
US= -1, I
EA= -1) or no news
(I
US=0, I
EA=0). “Good” news are defined as those news that, based on our findings
presented in sections 4.1–4.3, are expected to lead to an appreciation and “bad” news to a
depreciation of the respective currencies.
9 Hence the two indicator functions aggregate all
domestic news into a single indicator for each country. We then formulate the modified
version of equation (1) as













1 1 ln ln (3)
We estimate equation (3) using the WLS methodology described in section 3, with
results for German and US news reported in the first rows of tables 7 and 8, respectively.
Due to the pooling of all domestic macroeconomic variables into a single measure, the
estimates of the size of the exchange rate response become statistically significant, with
each parameter showing the expected sign.
The drawback of this approach of course is that the coefficients can be interpreted
only as average measures of the news effects of a country’s fundamentals and hide the
heterogeneity of the importance of individual variables, as outlined in sections 4.1–4.3.
                                                          
9 On days with more than one announcement, we took the news of the relatively more important variable,
based on our findings in section 4.1. Moreover, due to the ambiguousness of the sign for the price variables,
we tested the inclusion of the price variables with the opposite sign, but did not find any significant
differences in the econometric results. Also note that monetary policy shocks are not included in this indicator
functions.19
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However, the key point we want to make with this analysis is that also euro area news
about fundamentals have an important and significant effect on the exchange rate, even if
this effect is somewhat smaller than that of US fundamentals.
5.  Asymmetries in exchange rate responses to news of fundamentals
Since the linear benchmark model of section 4 can only reveal average, systematic
reactions of the exchange rate, it is necessary to analyse whether the reaction is indeed time
invariant, or whether news effects of fundamentals depend on factors like the existing
market conditions. Work on herd behaviour (Banerjee 1992) and informational cascades
(Bikchandani et al. 1992), for instance, show that economic agents may interpret, process
and react to information in very different ways depending on the conditions and the
environment in which they operate. In particular, the news content of any given news may
be larger if there is a high degree of uncertainty in the markets and market participants
search for guidance about the future course of the economy.
The aim of this section is to analyse whether such asymmetries are present in foreign
exchange markets. While there has been some work on this issue for bond markets
(Fleming and Remolona 1997), such analysis is quite novel for foreign exchange
markets.
10 We analyse the role of different measures of market uncertainty, looking at the
size and sign effects of news (section 5.1), and at exchange rate volatility and uncertainty
about the future direction of the economy (section 5.2).
5.1  Size effects and sign effects of news
There is a broad literature for equity markets showing that stock prices react more strongly
to negative news than to positive ones. The underlying reason for this asymmetry lies in
the interaction of what is commonly known as leverage effects and volatility feedback
effects.
11 The argument is that a shock affects the level of asset prices not only directly by
changing the state of the world – altering the leverage of firms – but also by changing the
volatility of asset prices. A positive shock raises the stock price of a firm by improving its
leverage, but at the same time the increased volatility lowers the stock’s value because
                                                          
10 Galati and Ho (2001) conduct some asymmetry tests for exchange rates and find mixed evidence for the
short period of 1999-2000. Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) find responses to vary depending
on the sign of the news and the uncertainty of the forecast.
11 For instance, Campbell and Hentschel (1992) provide a nice discussion and compelling empirical evidence
for the presence of such effects for equity markets.20
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risk-averse investors require higher returns for bearing the additional risk. In case of a
positive shock, leverage effects and volatility feedback effects have the opposite effect on
the asset price while the two effects are mutually reinforcing in case of negative shocks.
Thus, negative shocks tend to have a larger effect on the level of equity prices.
We test for the presence of such sign effects for foreign exchange markets by using
the same indicator function of section 4.5, distinguishing between “good” news, “bad”
news and no news in the foreign exchange market. To check for the difference between the
effects of such positive news and negative news, we estimate the model
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with DP,t=1 if the news is positive (It=1) and DN,t=1 if the news is negative (It= -1), both
dummies being zero otherwise. The estimation therefore enables us to compare the
coefficient for the effect of good news (βP) with the one for negative news (βN), for both
the United States and the euro area.
The second row in Table 7 shows that only negative news in Germany/ the euro area
have a statistically significant effect on the exchange rate, in line with the findings reported
by Galati and Ho (2003). However, there is no such evidence for the United States, where
the point estimate is similar for both types of news, and both are estimated to be
statistically significant.
12
A question related to the one on sign effects is whether large shocks have a bigger
impact than smaller ones. The rationale for such size effects, again widely confirmed for
the analysis of other asset prices, is that larger shocks may contain a proportionally larger
news content, thus causing a larger adjustment of the exchange rate. We define the model
for testing this hypothesis in a similar way to equation (4), only now that DP,t=1 if the news
is in the highest or the lowest quartile of the distribution and DN,t=1 if the news is in the
middle two quartiles of the distribution. The third row in table 7 shows evidence for such
size effects for Germany/the euro area: it is the large surprises that exert a statistically
significant impact on exchange rates, whereas small surprises are insignificant.
                                                          
12 Unfortunately, statistical tests on differences between the coefficients in the right and left panels of tables 7
and 8 do generally not show any significant difference.21
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Overall, the findings provide support for the hypothesis that the reaction of exchange
rate to macroeconomic news depends both on the sign as well as the size of the news that
reaches the financial markets.
5.2  The importance of uncertainty
Theoretical and empirical models of news and uncertainty have argued that market
participants may react more strongly to news in periods when they are uncertain about the
state and direction of the economy (e.g. Veronesi 1999). To investigate this link in our
context, we test whether the exchange rate reacts more strongly to news when uncertainty
among market participants is high. We explore different proxies for uncertainty.
First, we ask whether news have a larger effect if previous exchange rate volatility
has been high. We therefore define high market uncertainty as the situation when exchange
rate volatility was above its sample mean during the previous one week, one month, two
months etc. till one year. Which of these time horizons is most sensible essentially depends
on the memory and previous experience of market participants. It seems that market
participants may give greater weight to the immediate past and we therefore prefer the
volatility measures with shorter horizons, but nevertheless test also for longer horizons.
Our econometric model is similar to the one of equation (4), only that now DP,t=1 if
the exchange rate volatility over the previous 1 week or 1 month etc. was above its sample
mean, and DN,t=1 if the volatility was below its mean. Row 4 in tables 7 and 8 reveal that
the news effects of fundamentals are particularly significant if exchange rate volatility was
high during the previous week, for both the United States and the euro area. Using longer
time horizons for measuring exchange rate volatility does not change this finding. Second,
we test whether news have larger effects on exchange rates during periods when markets
were surprised by previous news systematically in the same fashion, e.g. if there has been a
series of positive surprises or an accumulation of negative surprises over the last period.
The hypothesis in the vein of the influential work by Veronesi (1999) is therefore that
markets react less to news when previous news have been pointing in the same direction,
i.e. if they have been persistently more positive or persistently more negative than
expected, and more if previous news were contradictory to one another.
As before, such a measure can be calculated over different time horizons. Choosing a
three-month horizon, we define the history of surprises to be of different signs if the
cumulated surprises of It over the past one month were in the middle two quartiles of its22
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distribution. Accordingly, the history of surprises is defined to be of the same sign if these
cumulated surprises are either very positive – i.e. in the top quartile – or very negative – in
the bottom quartile of the distribution. Our econometric model is again similar to the one
of equation (4), only that now DP,t=1 if the history of surprises shares the same sign, and
DN,t=1 if the history has mixed signs
The results reported in rows 5 and 6 of Tables 7 and 8 show that the effects of
German announcements are estimated significantly only in the case of a history with mixed
surprises in Germany, whereas US announcements exert significant effects in all scenarios.
These findings again confirm the importance and dominance of the US market as the main
determinant for the relevance of news effects of fundamentals on the US dollar –
euro/DEM exchange rate.
Third, an alternative way to analyse the role of uncertainty is to test whether news
have a larger effect in periods when there have been many large surprises in the recent
weeks and months. The intuition is as follows. The occurrence of several large surprises
means that market participants have not been able to forecast well the economic
environment. Thus in a period when there were several large news surprises in the recent
past, investors may attach more weight and react more strongly to new announcements.
Formally, a period of "high domestic uncertainty", as in row 7 of Tables 7 and 8, is defined
when there have been more large than small surprises over the past one month, three
months, etc. In this context, we define a surprise to be large if it is above its average value.
Row 7 shows the results when accounting only for domestic news, while row 8
shows results taking into account news in the United States and the euro area. The findings
are convincing as they show that both the US and the euro area markets react significantly
to news only in periods of high domestic uncertainty. For German announcements, this
conclusion also holds when defining uncertainty to include the surprises emanating from
the United States (row 8 of Table 7). Overall, the findings provide support to the
hypothesis that markets react more to news in an environment of uncertainty.
6.  Evaluating the real-time model of fundamentals and exchange rates
We have so far shown that fundamentals have indeed a significant and time-varying effect
on exchange rates on a daily basis. What we have not answered yet is how well
fundamentals can explain overall changes in exchange rates, i.e. to evaluate the goodness-23
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of-fit of our real-time model. This is an important question because the statistical
significance of parameter estimates for daily fundamentals by itself does not necessarily
imply that fundamentals explain well the magnitude or even the direction of exchange rate
movements in the short- to medium-term.
For this purpose, we take the coefficients obtained from estimating equation (1) and
multiply these with their respective announcement news for each variable and in each
month.
13 Adding up the effects for all fundamentals in each month allows us to compare
the actual change in the US dollar – euro/DEM exchange rate with the one explained by
the fundamentals of our model.
Figure 3 shows the actual and the predicted exchange rate developments of the US
dollar – euro/DEM for the period January 1993 – February 2003. The chart shows the large
degree of variability of the exchange rate over the period, with first the DEM appreciating
vis-à-vis the US dollar till early 1995 and then the US dollar appreciating until 2001. The
exchange rate predicted on the basis of our news surprises is much smoother. Given the
way the real-time model is set up, this finding is consistent with what we expected: market
participants generally are reasonably good in correctly anticipating announcements about
fundamentals. As we have shown, market expectations are unbiased and efficient, and
therefore there should be no large swings in the real-time model based on news surprises.
Nevertheless, the real-time model based on surprises correctly indicates the general
trend of the exchange rate over time: that is, an expected appreciation of the US dollar
between 1995 and late 1999, and a recovery of the euro thereafter. What this implies is that
during the period 1995-1999, economic agents were, on average, relatively more positively
surprised by economic news in the United States than in Europe. This is intuitively
convincing as the United States moved from a recession in the early 1990s to a tremendous
economic boom in the late 1990s, during which the economic performance of the US
economy outpaced that of the euro area and Germany. After 2000, the US economy slowed
down much more significantly, albeit from a higher level, than the euro area economy.
This created more negative news about the US economy than for the euro area, and hence
our model predicts an appreciation of the euro between late 2000 and 2003.
14 Overall,
                                                          
13 The reasons for moving from daily frequency to monthly frequency are that many days in our model do not
have any announcements, and also the fact that actual and predicted exchange rate developments become
more easily comparable graphically when using a lower frequency than daily data.
14 Note that these temporary trends in the model with news is not inconsistent with the unbiasedness and
efficiency of the expectations of market participants. Of course in the long-run, the predicted exchange rate
should not change significantly from its original level in order for the unbiasedness and efficiency of the
expectations data to hold.24
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when looking at the whole sample period 1993-2003, the US dollar – euro/DEM change
predicted by the model is almost identical to the overall change in the actual exchange rate.
Given that market participants do not make systematic mistakes in their expectations,
one therefore cannot expect the model with news surprises to explain the exchange rate
movement in the medium-term. Recall that the news st in our model capture only a small
part of the information about fundamentals that are actually incorporated into the markets,
namely the unexpected component of an announcement. The expected component has been
incorporated previously, but since we do not know when this information has been
incorporated we cannot measure its effect on the exchange rate in the econometric model.
As a second step, to capture the effect of the full announcement – i.e. the unexpected
component as well as the expected component – we make the assumption that the expected
component is incorporated into the exchange rate in the same way the unexpected one is.
We therefore use the coefficients obtained from estimating equation (1) and multiply these
with the change in the announcement of each fundamental. We then aggregate the effects
of all variables to get the predicted overall effect of fundamentals on the exchange rate.
Figure 4 shows the predicted and the actual exchange rates based on this exercise.
The predicted exchange rate now moves much more and tracks significantly better the
large swings in the actual US dollar – euro/DEM exchange rate. Although the predicted
rate does again not explain the large magnitude in the exchange rate swings, it nevertheless
does a reasonable good job in tracking the direction of the exchange rate movements. The
short-lived appreciation of the US dollar in 1993 is tracked as well as the subsequent
appreciation of the DEM till 1995. The model anticipates correctly part of the US dollar
appreciation between 1995 and 1999. Moreover, the model tracks reasonably well the
overall appreciation of the euro between late 2000 and early 2003. However, the period for
which the model performs poorly is from mid-1999 to the end of 2000. In this period, the
US dollar appreciated by about 20% vis-à-vis the euro whereas our model does not
anticipate any change in the exchange rate or even a slight depreciation of the US dollar.
Interestingly, this period largely coincides with the sample tested by Galati and Ho (2003),
which have found the exchange rate to respond dominantly to bad news emanating from
the euro area, while ignoring good news.
As the third and final step of the goodness-of-fit analysis, we would like to know
how the model with real-time data compares to a model using vintage data. Since vintage
data becomes available with a delay of often several months, we cannot assign a particular25
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day to when the vintage data is incorporated into prices. We do therefore perform the test
at monthly rather than daily frequency, and use the change in the announced data compared
to the previous announcement (At) rather than the surprise component of the
announcement (st). Basically, this assumes that information on the change in the
announced data is priced in by the market within the month of the announcement. The
model is thus:
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and the volatility equation
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now with the absolute values of the announcement changes (At).
Table 9 compares the absolute changes and the correctly explained directional
changes of the model (5)-(6) with real-time data with the same model but where the
announcement changes are based on vintage data. Both models still account for a small
proportion of the magnitude in absolute monthly exchange rate movements. However, the
real-time data model performs markedly better in explaining directional changes than the
vintage data model. The model with real-time data explains correctly 73% of the monthly
exchange rate changes compared to only 60% of the vintage data model for the full period
1993-2003 and 58% for 1999-2003. Overall, the ability to account for about 75% of the
monthly directional changes in the US dollar-euro exchange rate also compares very
favourably to other standard models in the literature using vintage data (see e.g. Cheung,
Chinn and Garcia Pascual 2002).
7.  Conclusions
The paper presented evidence that monetary policy and macroeconomic fundamentals are
indeed an important driving force behind exchange rate movements. The approach the
paper took is relatively novel for the analysis of exchange rates in that we look at the role26
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of  news about fundamentals. By extracting the news component of macroeconomic
announcements with the help of market expectations based on survey data, the paper tested
to what extent such real-time news in the United States and in the euro area/Germany
affected the US dollar – euro/DEM exchange rate during the period 1993-2003.
The empirical findings confirm that news about fundamentals have a significant
effect on the exchange rate. Economic developments in the United States prove to play a
bigger role in explaining exchange rate movements than economic news in the euro area
and in Germany. We show that this finding may not only reflect the relatively greater
importance of the US economy, but that it is at least in part due to the fact that US
announcements are usually released earlier than euro area or German announcements. The
implication is that US announcements have a relatively higher news content than
comparable euro area announcements.
A key result of the paper is that the effect of fundamentals on exchange rates depends
on market conditions. We find that news about fundamentals have a particularly big impact
in an environment of high market uncertainty and large previous exchange rate volatility.
In addition, the results suggest that negative news and large unexpected news have a larger
effect on exchange rates than positive and smaller unexpected announcement surprises.
Robustness and goodness-of-fit tests show that our model with real-time data does
well in explaining the direction though not the magnitude of monthly exchange rate
changes. In particular, we find that an exchange rate model with real-time data
substantially outperforms the same model using vintage data. Overall, the findings of the
paper suggest that looking at real-time data – that is, information that is actually available
to market participants when making their trading and investment decisions – may help us
better understand and track the importance of fundamentals for exchange rate
developments.
Several open questions arise from the paper. In particular, why does the real-time
data model do a good job in explaining the direction but not the magnitude of exchange
rate changes? Is this due to the fact that we exclude or cannot measure other relevant news
that point in the same direction as the available real-time data? Or is this explained by the
overreaction of markets, related to factors such as bubbles or herd behaviour, which goes
beyond the public information that becomes available to the markets? A more
comprehensive approach to modelling exchange rate which combines the three different
approaches of news effects, order flow and chartist behaviour may prove a promising
avenue to disentangle these issues.27
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Appendix
Table 1: Real-time versus vintage data:
the example of US GDP, 1993-2003
advance vs. preliminary advance vs. preliminary final
preliminary vs. final final revision
1 revision
2
1993-2003 0.51% 0.21% 0.61% 0.53 0.86
    1993-1996 0.49% 0.21% 0.56% 0.56 0.74
    1997-2000 0.50% 0.23% 0.63% 0.59 0.98
    2001-2003 0.56% 0.19% 0.68% 0.62 0.97
Notes:
1
 correlation coefficient between preliminary GDP revision and surprise of preliminary GDP announcement.
2
 correlation coefficient between final GDP revision and surprise of final GDP announcement.
mean of absolute revisions in US GDP correlation between surprise &30
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Table 2: Macroeconomic announcements, release dates and times
Usual lag: # of
Announcement # Observ. Release min max months
Germany
GDP Q/Q (%) February-93 - 26/02/03 42 08:00 23 10 2/3
Ifo Business Climate Index August-96 - 25/02/03 75 10:00 15 27 1
Business confidence balance May-99 - 28/02/03 36 12:00 2 8 1
PPI M/M (%) February-93 - 24/02/03 121 08:00 17 27 1
Retail Sales, real SA M/M (%) February-93 - 03/02/03 118 08:00 9 18 2
Trade Balance February-93 - 11/02/03 121 08:00 10 29 2
M3 Y/Y (%) February-93 - 27/02/03 94 09:30 18 26 1
Unemployment February-93 - 05/02/03 120 10:00 3 10 1
CPI M/M (%) February-93 - 24/01/03 119 after 11:00 23 30 0
Industrial production SA M/M (%) February-93 - 10/02/03 120 various 1 10 2
Manufacturing orders M/M (%) February-93 - 07/02/03 120 after 11:00 1 10 2
USA
Real GDP (S.A.A.R.)  Advance Y/Y  February-93 - 30/01/03 41 08:30 26 31 1
Consumer confidence February-93 - 25/02/03 121 10:00 24 31 0
CPI M/M (%) February-93 - 21/02/03 121 08:30 12 21 1
Housing starts February-93 - 19/02/03 121 08:30 16 20 1
Industrial production SA M/M (%) February-93 - 14/02/03 121 09:15 13 17 1
N.A.P.M. February-93 - 03/02/03 121 10:00 1 4 1
Nonfarm payrolls February-93 - 07/02/03 121 08:30 1 9 1
PPI M/M (%) February-93 - 20/02/03 121 08:30 9 16 1
Retail sales (%) February-93 - 13/02/03 121 08:30 9 15 1
Trade balance February-93 - 20/02/03 121 08:30 15 22 2
Unemployment rate (%) February-93 - 07/02/03 121 08:30 1 10 1
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Table 3: Summary statistics for macroeconomic announcements, surveys, and
surprises
Announcement Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Germany
GDP Q/Q (%) 0.346 0.641 0.322 0.607 0.024 0.212
Ifo Business Climate Index 95.009 5.256 95.048 4.325 -0.039 1.162
Business confidence balance -4.185 7.458 -4.519 7.802 0.333 1.000
PPI M/M (%) 0.069 0.275 0.094 0.163 -0.026 0.215
Retail Sales, real SA M/M (%) -0.795 3.044 -0.732 1.732 -0.063 2.781
Trade Balance 4.691 1.894 4.353 1.330 0.338 1.442
M3 Y/Y (%) 6.294 4.711 5.853 3.933 0.441 1.872
Unemployment 6.009 31.292 3.126 20.475 2.883 23.194
CPI M/M (%) 0.159 0.231 0.154 0.187 0.005 0.128
Industrial production SA M/M (%) 0.183 1.945 0.197 0.815 -0.014 1.742
Manufacturing orders M/M (%) 0.278 2.401 0.128 0.889 0.150 2.185
USA
Real GDP (S.A.A.R.)  Advance Y/Y (%) 3.234 1.735 2.830 1.592 0.404 0.772
Consumer confidence 110.188 23.523 109.466 23.204 0.723 4.960
CPI M/M (%) 0.204 0.169 0.227 0.111 -0.023 0.119
Housing starts 1.503 0.152 1.489 0.134 0.013 0.069
Industrial production SA M/M (%) 0.209 0.490 0.161 0.347 0.048 0.253
N.A.P.M. 51.812 4.683 51.974 4.431 -0.162 1.933
Nonfarm payrolls 152.759 174.240 161.045 108.197 -8.286 118.643
PPI M/M (%) 0.102 0.420 0.165 0.193 -0.063 0.304
Retail sales (%) 0.318 0.921 0.332 0.502 -0.014 0.652
Trade balance -16.349 8.676 -16.163 8.716 -0.186 1.837
Unemployment rate (%) 5.179 0.911 5.220 0.934 -0.042 0.143
Average workweek 34.376 0.191 34.386 0.190 -0.010 0.094
Source: MMS, authors' calculations.
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Table 4: Summary statistics for monetary policy announcements, surveys, and
surprises
Monetary policy Number of Mean abs. Mean abs. Std. Dev. Mean abs. Std. Dev.
announcements meetings announc.* survey* surprise* "correct" "false" **
Federal Reserve 78 0.144 0.120 0.211 0.049 0.112 65 13
Bundesbank 144 0.040 0.025 0.066 0.044 0.113 127 17
ECB 72 0.052 0.041 0.086 0.044 0.087 61 11
Monetary policy Number of Mean abs. Mean abs. Std. Dev. Mean abs. Std. Dev.
changes changes changes* survey* surprise* "correct" "false" **
Federal Reserve 31 0.363 0.281 0.334 0.102 0.173 23 8
Bundesbank 13 0.442 0.120 0.120 0.322 0.114 1 12
ECB 12 0.354 0.147 0.190 0.207 0.249 4 8
Notes:
*   Means are calculated from the absolute numbers of the announcements, surveys and surprises.
**  A "correct" forecast is defined as an absolute surprise of within +12.5 basis points of the announcement or change.
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Table 5: Exchange rate response to individual macro and monetary policy variables
WLS model of equation (1), 1993-2003
Monetary policy -0.590 (-1.304) Monetary policy -1.616 ** (-2.364)
CPI -0.034 (-0.309) N.A.P.M. -0.526 *** (-3.351)
M3 0.065 (0.291) Nonfarm payrolls -0.246 ** (-2.485)
Unemployment -0.043 (-0.584) Industrial production -0.212 (-1.348)
Ifo Business Climate 0.857 ** (2.304) Advance GDP -0.616 ** (-2.427)
Industrial production 0.046 (0.664) Consumer confidence -0.652 ** (-2.254)
Manufacturing orders 0.053 (0.836) Retail sales -0.133 (-0.995)
Retail Sales 0.098 (1.321) CPI 0.198 * (1.561)
PPI 0.091 (1.102) Unemployment rate 1.703 *** (2.848)
GDP 0.112 (0.461) Housing starts 0.009 (0.038)
Trade Balance 0.010 (0.086) PPI 0.041 (0.472)
Business confidence 1.028 (1.391) Trade balance -0.348 (-1.133)
Average workweek -0.338 * (-1.597)
Notes:
*,**,*** denotes significance at the 90%, 95%, 99% levels, respectively. Numbers in brackets are t-statistics.
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Table 6: The effect of announcement timing on the magnitude and the significance of
exchange rate reactions
Constant 0.000 *** (-3.583) 1.764 *** (5.930)




*,**,*** denotes significance at the 90%, 95%, 99% levels, respectively. 
Numbers in brackets are t-statistics.35
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Table 9: Goodness of fit: vintage data versus real-time data
Note:
"Average absolute estimated change" shows the average implied monthly exchange rate change based on US and
German/euro area macroeconomic fundamentals and their implied parameter estimates.
"Correct directional explanation" indicates the percentage of monthly directional changes that are correctly explained by





















1993-2003 1.69% 0.77% 60.71% 0.64% 73.21%
1999-2003 1.87% 0.84% 58.54% 0.81% 73.17%
VINTAGE DATA REAL-TIME DATA38
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Figure 2: Distribution of release days of macroeconomic announcements
US Macroeconomic Announcement Dates
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